Post-Foundationalist Ethics

Albert Schweitzer, like Leo Tolstoy, attempted to ground an ethics in a universal impulse. For Tolstoy, that impulse was the unmistakable call of conscience; for Schweitzer, it was the "will-to-live." The desire to locate a universal foundation for ethical thought and action is understandable because it can be argued to obligate every human being. All philosophical foundationalisms, however, fail on empirical grounds. After Rorty, foundationalism ought to have little purchase on our thought--no matter how much it may continue to lay claim to our affections. Ethical principles, on the other hand, remain viable insofar as they have qualities that recommend them. In The Philosophy of Civilization (first English translation, 1949), Schweitzer articulated an ethical principle that stands on its own (despite his attempt to ground it in his notion of the will-to-live):

"The basic principle of ethics, that principle which is a necessity of thought, which has a definite content, which is engaged in constant, living, and practical dispute with reality, is: Devotion to life resulting from reverence for life" (POC, 306).

One can omit Schweitzer's assurance that this principle is "a necessity of thought" without losing much. The key to his understanding of ethics is that, founded or not, ethics involves "constant, living, and practical dispute with reality" (as it has come to be accepted in a given community, i.e., the status quo). Whenever and wherever the status quo fails to show a "devotion to life resulting from reverence for life," it becomes subject to ethical engagement and conscientious dispute.

The "definite content" of this principle is devotion resulting from reverence. Tolstoy would argue it is the "golden rule." The relative merits of these alternatives is a meditation for another time.