In Islam, The Edge Is Where The Action Is

From its inception, The Mazeppist has been the blog of a "border intellectual" on the edge of Islam. It has featured (and will continue to feature) the thoughts of its author as well as those of others of a similar persuasion (e.g., Tolstoy, Camus).

The instant post features Columbia University Middle East historian Richard Bulliet's 2004 restatement of the argument he made in his 1994 book Islam: The View from the Edge. That book was a study of medieval Islam and focused on "situations where people were in the process of becoming Muslim through conversion, or of reconnecting to their religious roots through some sort of spiritual renewal" (Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 138).

Bulliet termed such situations "edge" locations in order to (1) distinguish between those whose social locations did not match "what historians conventionally consider the political and religious core of Muslim history: the caliphate and its successor states; the post-Mongol empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals; the development of Islamic law; and the intellectual issues arising from the medieval confrontation with Aristotelian ideas" [139]; (2) "... avoid the words 'periphery' and 'margin' because readers often understand them in purely geographical terms and instinctively consider the 'center' more important" [ibid]; and (3) convey his belief that "the edge in Islam, rather than the center, has been where new things happen" [ibid].

The necessity to re-state the argument after ten years arose from the fact that many reviewers of the earlier book simply did not get it. They insisted that "edge" meant geographical periphery and, even, "provincial peculiarity" [ibid]. The Mazeppist admires Professor Bulliet's persistence in the face of collegial incomprehension and, moreover, is grateful for it. Here is what Bulliet wrote:

In the absence of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, narratives of Islamic history put political institutions at the center of the story: first the caliphate and then a plethora of successor states, each with its judges, jurisconsults, and market inspectors as prescribed by the shari'a. Nevertheless, these political institutions generally lacked an extensive capacity for religious guidance. From the death of the Prophet onward, Muslims who wanted to know what was expected of them religiously did not look to the government. They followed instead the practices of their local community, as transmitted from generation to generation in written or oral form. Alternatively, they sought pastoral instruction from religious scholars and saintly individuals. Sometimes these were government officials, but usually not. In most times and places, the prevailing political institutions had little interest in or control over these sources of guidance [139].

Like people of all faiths, Muslims find important elements of identity and solace in observing as adults the practices they first encounter as children. Local custom does not offer such clear guidance, however, for people who are considering a change in their religious identity either by embracing a different variant of their ancestral faith; or by converting to a different religion. Nor does customary practice help people who think their community is too little involved with religion and who seek a more intensive religious experience; or the other direction, people who desire a more or less nonreligious way of life. All of these manifestations of the edge raise questions about how to behave and what to believe [139-140].

Edge situations, which have parallels in other religions, have been unusually creative in the history of Islam because answering questions raised by prospective converts to Islam, and by Muslims in spiritual quandary, exposes underlying ambiguities about the sources of spiritual authority. Muslims committed to the beliefs and practices of the center have few uncertainties in this area. The Quran; the hadith, or collected accounts of the words and deeds of Muhammad; the shari'a; and the consensus of learned Muslims on spiritual matters make it clear to them what it means to be a Muslim. But Islam's edges have often lacked such clarity, sometimes because of confrontation with local non-Muslim traditions, and sometimes because of the preaching of assertive individuals whose views differ from those of the center [140].

Zones of intercultural confrontation and unconventional preaching by charismatic individuals pose problems for all religions, of course, but formalized ecclesiastical structures usually suffice to minimize them. Absent such ecclesiastical structures, problems arise. Who is authorized to answer the questions posed by believers? Does the notion of "authorized response" mean much in edge contexts? What determines the legitimacy of charismatic preachers? [140]

In drawing attention to the edge in Islam, I make no claim that the edge distinguishes Islam from other religions. I want, rather, to highlight the comparative potency of developments on the edge in conditions of weakly institutionalized religious authority. The center in Islam has a frequently expressed horror of innovation (bid'a) in matters of faith and practice. This position buttresses the widespread impression that Islam is an unchanging religion. The vitality of Islam's edge communities has developed in the face of this rhetorical abhorrence and given rise to remarkable diversity under the name of Islam. Confrontation between the conservative center and the creative edge will surely continue in the future as the current crisis of authority in Islam plays itself out [140-141].

Diversity exists in every religious tradition, but diversity has been particularly pronounced in Islam. This does not mean, however, that individual Muslims necessarily consider their faith to be marked by great diversity. To the contrary, uncertainty about what is authoritative can foster a tenacious adherence to practices and beliefs that specific communities consider to be the truest version of Islam. When there is no church acting as guardian of the faith, after all, the duty falls to the individual believer [141].

Today there is a strong impetus in many parts of the Muslim world to suppress divergent local beliefs and win people to more conventional interpretations of Islam. Missionary (da'wa) efforts based in Saudi Arabia are particularly active. This does not mean, however, that unconventional practices and beliefs on the edge are necessarily doomed to be overwritten by stronger influences from the center. Several major developments that are now considered integral to the Islam of the center originally formed on the edge. Collecting the sayings of Muhammad, for example, flourished in Iran at a time when conversion to Islam was at a particularly dynamic point. All six of the collections that Sunni Muslims eventually canonized as the truest expressions of their prophet's faith and practice were compiled in Iran during the ninth century. A second example: Religious seminaries (madrasas) first appeared in the tenth century far to the northeast of the Arab heartland in the frontier zone that today separates Iran from Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. Some historians suspect a Buddhist institutional origin. Only after two centuries of local development on the edge did these institutions spread throughout much of the Muslim world and standardize both Sunni and Shi'ite education. Sufi brotherhoods afford a third example of creation on the edge feeding back into the center. Some of the most successful brotherhoods, such as the Mevleviya and the Bektashiya, originated in what is today Turkey during the period of religious ferment that followed the collapse of Byzantine Christian power there in 1071. Other popular brotherhoods that enjoyed widespread success arose in other edge situations, such as the mountains of central Afghanistan (the Chishtiya), among the mixed Arab-Berber populations of North Africa (the Tijaniya), and ... in northeast India (the Shattariya) [144-145].

Developments like these demonstrate that Muslim communities that are remote from what appears at any point in time to be Islam's center have shown remarkable dynamism, creativity, and adaptability. They further demonstrate that some of [sic] edge developments have subsequently become incorporated into the Islam of the center. A search for parallels in other religions would most likely lead to the history of sects and denominations. However, the flexibility that has characterized Islam historically discourages such an approach. Though divisions within Islam have from time to time acquired names and become formalized, the flow of ideas, practices, and beliefs within and among communities discourages efforts to discover precise and permanent intrafaith boundaries. The annual mingling of hundreds of thousands of Muslims of every variety of belief during the pilgrimage to Mecca symbolizes this fluidity [145].

Looking at contemporary circumstances, it is evident that Muslims are living in a time of many edges. Observers agree that Islam is growing rapidly through conversion, the most common locus of edge developments. This is occurring in interfaith frontier zones in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and Europe rather than in the old geographical heartland of the faith. Just as importantly, Muslims in many regions are actively seeking to intensify their religious observances to a secular society. Edges of this sort exist in all parts of the Muslim world. In the old Muslim heartland, they are often accompanied by an attitude of self-help and social responsibility framed against the failure of nationalist anticlerical government. In the re-Islamizing post-Soviet republics, violence in the name of Islam garners the headlines while the quiet multiplication of mosques and schools begins to reverse two generations of official atheism. In European and American diaspora communities, Muslims discuss ways of coping with governments and societies that they increasingly see as unfriendly, if not actually hostile [145-146].

Given the history of edge phenomena in Islam, what should be expected today is the appearance of myriad diverse movements addressing the spiritual and social needs of specific groups of believers. What should further be expected is that conservative voices from the center--including both governments in majority Muslim countries and the marginalized traditional ulama--will weigh less in the future spiritual balance than some of the new expressions of Islam on the edge. Overviews of Muslim religious activity worldwide, whether by Muslims or non-Muslims (and among non-Muslims, whether by people gazing about in fear and hatred, or by others of more friendly disposition) support both of these expectations. Thus in all likelihood, tomorrow's center will develop on today's edge [146].